To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This directly leads to the POSSIBLE WINNER problem that asks, given a set of partial votes, whether a distinguished candidate can still become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent examples include plurality, k-approval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NP-hardness results for some special cases, we settle the computational complexity for all but one scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted voters, we show that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.
Introduction
Voting scenarios arise whenever the preferences of different parties (voters) have to be aggregated to form a joint decision. This is what happens in political elections, group decisions, web site rankings, or multiagent systems. Often, the voting process is executed in the following way: each voter provides his preference as a ranking (linear order) of all the possible alternatives (candidates). Given these rankings as an input, a voting rule produces a subset of the candidates (winners) as an output. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders (or partial votes) instead of linear ones: For example, it might be impossible for the voters to provide a complete preference list because the set of candidates is too large, as it is the case for web page ranking. In addition, not all voters might have given their preferences yet during the aggregation process, or new candidates might be introduced after some voters already have given their rankings. Moreover, one often has to deal with partial votes due to incomparabilities: for some voters it might not be possible to compare two candidates or certain groups of candidates, be it because of lack of information or due to personal reasons. Hence, the study of partial voting profiles is natural and essential. One question that immediately comes to mind is whether any information on a possible outcome of the voting process can be given in the case of incomplete votes. More specifically, in this paper, we study the POSSIBLE WINNER problem: Given a partial order for each of the voters, can a distinguished candidate c win for at least one extension of the partial orders into linear ones?
Of course, the answer to this question depends on the voting rule that is used. In this work, we will stick to the broad class of scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position that a candidate can take within a linear order, given as a scoring vector of length m in the case of m candidates. The scores of the candidates are then added over all votes and the candidates with the highest score win. Famous examples are Borda, defined by the scoring vectors (m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 0) and k-approval, defined by (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) starting with k ones. Two relevant special cases of k-approval are plurality, defined by (1, 0, . . . , 0), and veto, defined by (1, . . . , 1, 0). Typically, k-approval can be used in political elections whenever the voters can express their preference for k candidates within the set of all candidates. Another example is the Formula 1 scoring, which until the year 2009 used the scoring rule defined by the vector (10, 8, 6 , 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, . . ., 0) and since 2010 uses (25, 18, 15, 12, 10, 8, 6 , 4, 2, 1, 0, . . ., 0).
The study of the computational complexity of voting problems is an active area of research (see the surveys [9, 19] ). The POSSIBLE WINNER problem was introduced by Konczak and Lang [26] and has been further investigated since then for many types of voting systems [7, 27, 31, 33, 34] . Note that the related NECESSARY WINNER problem (Given a set of partial orders, does a distinguished candidate c win for every extension of the partial orders into linear ones?) can be solved in polynomial time for all scoring rules [34] .
A prominent special case of POSSIBLE WINNER is MANIPULATION (see e.g. [8, 13, 25, 36, 37] ). Here, the given set of partial orders consists of two subsets; one subset contains linearly ordered votes and the other one completely unordered votes. Clearly, all NP-hardness results would carry over from MANIPULATION to POSSIBLE WINNER. However, whereas the case of weighted voters is settled by a full dichotomy for MANIPULATION for scoring rules [25] , so far, for unweighted voters we are only aware of one NP-hardness result for a specially constructed scoring rule [35] . Indeed, the NP-hardness of MANIPULATION for Borda is a prominent open question [35, 36] . There are NP-hardness results for MANIPULATION in the unweighted voter case for several common voting rules which are not scoring rules [20, 21, 36] . Another closely related problem is PREFERENCE ELICITATION (see e.g. [11, 12] ). Here, the idea is to avoid that each voter has to report his whole preference list, but to ask only for some part of the information that suffices to determine a winner. Now, let us briefly summarize the known results for POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring rules. Correcting Konczak and Lang [26] who claimed polynomial-time solvability for all scoring rules, Xia and Conitzer [34] provided NP-completeness results for a class of scoring rules, more specifically, for all scoring rules that have four "equally decreasing score values" followed by another "strictly decreasing score value"; we will provide a more detailed discussion later. Betzler et al. [7] studied the multivariate complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring rules and other types of voting systems, providing an NP-hardness proof for k-approval in case of only two partial votes. However, this NP-hardness result holds only if k is part of the input and does not carry over for fixed values of k. Furthermore, whereas the corresponding many-one reduction relies on two partial votes, the construction used in this work makes use of an unbounded number of partial votes and thus is completely different.
Until now, the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER was still open for a large number of naturally appearing scoring rules. One such open case has been kapproval for small values of k which is motivated as follows. A common way of voting for a board consisting of a small number, for example, of five members, is that every voter awards one point each to five of the candidates (5-approval). A second example is given by voting systems in which each voter is allowed to specify a (small) group of favorites and a (small) group of most disliked candidates. As final example, we mention scoring rules that have decreasing differences between successive score values as, for example, the scoring vector (2 m , 2 m−1 , . . . , 0). This work aims at a computational complexity dichotomy for pure scoring rules. The class of pure scoring rules covers all of the common scoring rules. It only constitutes some restrictions in the sense that for different numbers of candidates the corresponding scoring vectors cannot be chosen completely independently (see Section 2). Our results can also be extended to broad classes of "non-pure" scoring rules, see Section 7. Altogether, we settle the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for all pure scoring rules except the scoring rule defined by (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0). For plurality and veto, we provide polynomial-time algorithms whereas for the remaining cases we show NP-completeness. Surprisingly, this includes the NP-hardness of POSSIBLE WINNER even for 2-approval. Our NP-hardness result for 2-approval has also been used to settle the complexity of the SWAP BRIBERY problem [16] .
Preliminaries
Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } be the set of candidates. A vote is a linear order (i.e., a transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation) on C. An n-voter profile P on C consists of n votes (v 1 , . . . , v n ) on C. A voting rule r is a function from the set of all profiles on C to the power set of C, that is r(P ) denotes the set of winners. (Positional) scoring rules are a special kind of voting rules. They are defined by scoring vectors − → α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m ) with integers α 1 ≥ α 2 ≥ · · · ≥ α m , the score values. More specifically, we define that a scoring rule r consists of a sequence of scoring vectors s 1 , s 2 , . . . such that for any i ∈ AE >0 there is a scoring vector s i for i candidates which can be computed in time polynomial in i. 2 Here, we focus our attention on pure scoring rules, that is for every i ≥ 2, the scoring vector for i candidates can be obtained from the scoring vector for i − 1 candidates by inserting an additional score value at an arbitrary position (respecting the described monotonicity). This definition includes all of the common protocols like Borda or k-approval. We further assume that α m = 0 and that there is no integer greater than one that divides all score values. This does not constitute a restriction since for every other voting system there must be an equivalent one that fulfills these constraints [25, Observation 2.2] . Moreover, we only consider non-trivial scoring rules, that is, scoring rules with α 1 = 0 for scoring vectors of every size.
For a vote v ∈ P and a candidate c ∈ C, let the score s(v, c) be defined by s(v, c) := α j where j is the position of c in v. For any profile P = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, let s(P, c) :
Whenever it is clear from the context which P we refer to, we will just write s(c). A scoring rule selects all candidates c as winners with maximum s(P, c) over all candidates.
A partial vote on C is a transitive and antisymmetric relation on C. We use > to denote the relation given between candidates in a linear order and ≻ to denote the relation given between candidates in a partial vote. Sometimes, we specify a whole subset of candidates in a partial vote, e.g., e ≻ D for a candidate e ∈ C and a subset of candidates D ⊆ C. Unless stated otherwise, this notation means that e ≻ d for all d ∈ D and there is no specified order among the candidates in D. In contrast, writing e > D in a linear order means that
Given a profile of partial votes P = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) on C, a candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner if there exists an extension
extends v i and c ∈ r(P ′ ). The corresponding decision problem is defined as follows.
POSSIBLE WINNER
Given: A set of candidates C, a profile of partial votes P = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) on C, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C. Question: Is there an extension profile
This definition allows that multiple candidates obtain the maximal score and we end up with a whole set of winners. If the possible winner c has to be unique, one speaks of a possible unique winner, and the corresponding decision problem is defined analogously. All our results hold for both cases. Several of our NP-hardness proofs rely on reductions from the NP-complete EX-ACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C) problem [24] defined as follows. Given a set of elements E = {e 1 , . . . , e q }, a family of subsets S = {S 1 , . . . , S t } with |S i | = 3 and S i ⊆ E for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, it asks whether there is a subset S ′ ⊆ S such that for every element e j ∈ E there is exactly one S i ∈ S ′ with e j ∈ S i . In our NP-hardness proofs we Scoring rule
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Plurality and Veto in P Proposition 1, Section 4 different-type NP-c (X3C) Theorem 1, Section 5 equal-type NP-c (MC/X3C) Theorem 2, Lemmata 3 -6, Section 6.1
Theorem 4, Section 6.2 and α 1 = 2 · α 2 (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) ? need to describe the consequence of extending partial votes for specific candidates. To this end, we say that a candidate c i is shifted to the left (right) by another candidate c j when adding the constraint c i ≻ c j (c j ≻ c i ) to a partial vote. In some of our theorems, we will need functions that map each instance of a certain problem P to some natural number and in some sense behave like a polynomial. For this sake, we call f : {I | I is an instance of P} → AE a poly-type function for P if the function value f (I) is bounded by a polynomial in |I| for every input instance I of P.
General strategy
This work aims at providing a dichotomy for POSSIBLE WINNER for practically relevant scoring rules. To this end, we will show the following.
Theorem. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for all non-trivial pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and scoring rules for which there is a constant z such that the produced scoring vector is (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) for every number of candidates greater than z. For plurality and veto, POSSIBLE WINNER is solvable in polynomial time.
The proof consists of several parts, see Table 1 for an overview. The polynomial time results for plurality and veto are based on flow computations. Regarding the NP-hardness results, we give many-one reductions that work for scoring rules that produce specific "types of scoring vectors" for an appropriate number of candidates. We combine the single results to obtain the main result in Section 7. To this end, we have to take into account that, in general, a scoring rule might produce different types of scoring vectors for different numbers of candidates.
The basic observation to classify the scoring vectors is that a scoring vector of unbounded size must have an unbounded number of different score values or an unbounded number of equal score values. This leads to the following strategy. First, we show NP-hardness for all scoring vectors having an unbounded number of different score values. To this end, we generalize a many-one reduction due to Xia and Conitzer [34] . Second, we deal with scoring vectors having an unbounded number of equal score values. Here, we consider two subcases, i.e., scoring vectors of type α 1 > α 2 = α m−1 > 0 but α 1 = 2 · α 2 , and all remaining scoring vectors with an unbounded number of equal score values.
Before stating the specific results, we give a construction scheme that is used in all many-one reductions in this work.
A General Scheme to Construct Linear Votes
In all many-one reductions presented in this work, one constructs a partial profile P consisting of a set of linear orders V l and a set of partial votes V p . The position of the distinguished candidate c is already determined in every vote from V p , that is, s(P ′ , c) is the same in every extension P ′ and thus is fixed. The "interesting" part of the reductions is given by the partial votes of V p in combination with upper bounds for the scores which the non-distinguished candidates can make in V p . For every candidate c ′ ∈ C\{c}, the maximum partial score s
is the maximum number of points c ′ may make in V p without beating c in P . More precisely, for the unique winner case, s
Since the maximum partial scores can be adjusted to the unique and to the winner case, all results hold for both cases.
In the following, we show that for all our reductions, there is an easy way to cast the linear votes such that the maximum partial scores that are required in the reductions are realized. For every many-one reduction of this work, it will be easy to verify that the underlying partial profile fulfills the following two properties. PROOF. We are interested in "setting" relative score difference between the distinguished candidate c and every other candidate. By inserting one linear order we change the relative score difference between c and all other candidates. To be able to change the relative score difference only for c and one specific candidate while keeping the relative score difference of c and all other candidates, we will build V l by sets of circular shifts instead of single votes. More precisely, for a set of candidates {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m } , a circular block consists of m linear orders as given in Figure 1 . Clearly, all candidates have the same score within a circular block.
We start with the construction for the winner case and then explain how to adapt it for the unique winner case. For the winner case (s 
Plurality and Veto
Employing network flows turned out to be useful to design algorithms for several voting problems (see e.g. [17, 18] ). Here, by using some flow computations very similar to [7, Theorem 6] , we show the following. PROOF. First, we give an algorithm for plurality. Let P on C denote a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance with distinguished candidate c. Clearly, it is safe to set c to the first position in all votes in which this is possible. Then the score of c is fixed at the maximum possible value. We denote the partial votes of P in which the first position is not taken by c as P 1 . Now, we can model the problem as network flow as follows (see Figure 2 ): The flow network consists of a source node s, a target node t, one node for every vote of P 1 , and one node for every candidate from C\{c}. There are three layers of arcs:
1. an arc from s to every node corresponding to a vote in P 1 with capacity one, 2. an arc from a node corresponding to v j ∈ P 1 to a node corresponding to a candidate c ′ ∈ C\{c} with capacity one if and only if c ′ can take the first position in an extension of v j , and 3. an arc from every node corresponding to c ′ ∈ C\{c} to target t with capacity s(c) − 1. Now, c is a possible winner if and only if there is a flow of size |P 1 |: The first layer simulates that the first position of every partial vote from P 1 has to be taken, the second layer that it can only be taken by appropriate candidates, and the last one that the score of every candidate will be lower than the score of c. Clearly, the flow network can be constructed in time polynomial in |P 1 | and an integral flow computation can be done in polynomial time [14] .
For veto, we first fix c at the best (leftmost) possible position in every vote. This fixes the maximum score of c. Then for every candidate c ′ ∈ C \ {c}, let z(c ′ ) denote the minimum number of last positions that c ′ must take such that it does not beat c. Let P 1 denote the set of partial votes in which c does not take the last position. Again, we model the problem by a flow network with source node s, target node t, one node for every candidate from C\{c}, and one node for every vote of P 1 . The arcs are as follows:
1. an arc from s to every node corresponding to c ′ ∈ C\{c} with capacity z(c ′ ), 2. an arc from a node corresponding to c ′ ∈ C\{c} to a node corresponding to v j ∈ P 1 with capacity one if and only if c ′ can take the last position in an extension of v j , and 3. an arc from every node corresponding to v j ∈ P 1 to target t with capacity 1.
By similar arguments as for plurality, it follows that c is a possible winner if and only if there is a flow of size c ′ ∈C\{c} z(c ′ ). 2
An unbounded number of positions with different score values
Xia and Conitzer [34] developed a many-one reduction from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS showing that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for any scoring rule with scoring vectors which contain four consecutive, "equally decreasing" score values, followed by another strictly decreasing score value. Using some additional gadgetry, we extend their proof to work for scoring vectors with an unbounded number of different, not necessarily equally decreasing score values.
We start by describing the basic idea employed in [34] (using a slightly modified construction). Given an X3C-instance (E, S), construct a partial profile P := V l ∪ V p on a set of candidates C where V l denotes a set of linear orders and V p a set of partial votes. To describe the basic idea, assume that there is a scoring vector with α 1 > α 2 and and the differences between the four following score values are equally decreasing, that is, α 2 − α 3 = α 3 − α 4 = α 4 − α 5 . Then, C := {c, x, w} ∪ E where E is the universe from the X3C-instance. The distinguished candidate is c. The candidates whose element counterparts belong to the set S i are denoted by e i1 , e i2 , e i3 . The partial votes V p consist of one partial vote v p i for every S i ∈ S which is given by
with C ′ := C\{x, e i1 , e i2 , e i3 , w}. Note that in v p i , the positions of all candidates except w, x, e i1 , e i2 , e i3 are fixed. More precisely, w has to be inserted between positions 1 and 5 maintaining the partial order x ≻ e i1 ≻ e i2 ≻ e i3 . By setting the linear votes, the maximum partial scores are realized such that the following three conditions hold.
• For every element candidate e ∈ E one has the following. Inserting w behind e in two partial votes has the effect that e would beat c, whereas when w is inserted behind e in at most one partial vote, c still beats e (Condition 1). Note that e may occur in several votes at different positions, e.g. e might be identical with e i1 and e j3 for i = j. However, due to the condition of "equally decreasing" scores, "shifting" e increases its score by the same value in all of the votes.
• The maximum partial score of x is set such that if takes more than |V p | − |E|/3 times the first position, then it would beat c. That is, w must be inserted before x at least |V p | − |E|/3 times (Condition 2).
• We set s
This implies that if w is inserted before x in |V p | − |E|/3 votes, then it must be inserted at the last possible position, that is, position 5, in all remaining votes (Condition 3).
Having an exact 3-cover for (E, S), extend the partial votes as follows.
is not in the exact 3-cover. Then, every element candidate e is shifted exactly once (in v p i for e ∈ S i , if S i is in the exact 3-cover) and thus is beaten by c. It is easy to verify that c beats w and x as well. In a yes-instance for (C, P, c), it follows directly from Condition 2 and 3 that w must have the position 5 in exactly |E|/3 votes and the first position in all remaining partial votes. Since there are |E|/3 partial votes such that three element candidates are shifted in each of them, due to Condition 1, every element candidate must appear in exactly one of these votes. Hence, c is a possible winner in P if and only if there exists an exact 3-cover of E.
By inserting further candidates, one can pad the construction such that is also works if the equally decreasing score differences appear at other positions [34] . Now, we consider the situation in which no such equally decreasing score differences appear at all. More precisely, we show how to extend the reduction to scoring vectors with strictly, but not equally decreasing scoring values. The problem we encounter is the following: By sending candidate w to the last possible position in the partial vote v p i , each of the candidates e i1 , e i2 , e i3 improves by one position and therefore improves its score by the difference given between the corresponding positions. In [34] , these differences all had the same value, but now we have to deal with varying differences. Since the same candidate e ∈ E may appear in several votes at different positions, e.g. e might be identical with e i1 and e j3 for i = j, it is not clear how to set the maximum partial score of e. Basically, to cope with this situation, we construct three partial votes v 
. . . In this way, if the candidate w is sent to the last possible position in all three partial votes of a set S i , each of the candidates e i1 , e i2 , e i3 improves its score by the same value. We only have to guarantee that whenever w is sent back in the partial vote v PROOF. Given an X3C-instance (E, S) with S = {S 1 , . . . , S t } and S i = {e i1 , e i2 , e i3 } for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, construct a partial profile P on C as follows. The set of candidates is defined as C := {x, w, c} ⊎ E ⊎ D 12 ⊎ D 13 ⊎ L (where ⊎ denotes the disjoint union), where E is the set of candidates that represent the elements of the universe of the X3C-instance,
and L := {l 1 , . . . , l t }. We define f ((E, S)) := |C|. To ease the presentation, we first assume that we have a strictly decreasing scoring vector of size f ((E, S)) and describe how to generalize this at the end of the proof. The partial profile con- Table 2 : Maximum partial scores. Recall that t = |S|, q = |E|, and ne = |{S i ∈ S | e ∈ S i }|.
sists of a set of partial votes V p and a set of linear votes V l . The partial votes are
, and C 3 i denote the remaining candidates that are fixed in an arbitrary order, respectively. Now, we give some notation needed to define the maximum partial scores. For c ′ ∈ C\{c}, let fixed(c ′ ) denote the number of points which c ′ makes in the partial votes in which the position of c ′ is already fixed. Let n e denote the number of subsets with e ∈ S i and q = |E|. Due to Lemma 1, one can set the maximum partial scores as given in Table 2 . The particular partial scores will be explained within the proof of the following claim. Claim: Candidate c is a possible winner of P if and only if there is an exact 3-cover for (E, S). "⇐": Given an exact 3-cover S ′ ⊆ S, complete the votes in V p in the following way: For each S i ∈ S ′ , place w in the last possible position (i.e., position 5 + 2t) in the partial votes v 
Furthermore, it is easy to see that s(l i ) < s max p (l i ) for every i. Every element candidate e is shifted to the left in exactly three partial votes. More precisely, in the three votes that correspond to S i ∈ S ′ with e ∈ S i , it makes α 2 + α 3 + α 4 points and (n e − 1) · (α 3 + α 4 + α 5 ) + fixed(e) points in the remaining votes and thus does not beat c. Every candidate from D 12 is not "fixed" in exactly one vote of every triple corresponding to an S i . More precisely, it can be shifted either in v 1 i or in v 2 i and never in v votes and α 5+i+t in the remaining t−q/3 votes and hence does not beat c. Altogether, c beats every other candidate and wins. "⇒": Consider an extension of P in which c wins. Due to its maximum partial score, candidate x can take the first position only q times. Thus, it must be shifted 3t − q times to position 2. Clearly, this is only possible if w is placed on the first position in 3t − q votes. Then due to its maximum partial score, w can only be set to position 5 + 2t in the remaining q votes. In the following, we will show that for every i, w takes position 5 + 2t in v Then it follows that in the votes in which w takes position 5 + 2t, the corresponding element candidates are shifted to the left and obtain α 2 + α 3 + α 4 points each, whereas they obtain α 3 + α 4 + α 5 points in the remaining corresponding vote triples. Since each element candidate e j can only obtain α 2 + α 3 + α 4 points exactly once (and the scoring values are strictly decreasing), the set S ′ := {S i | w is placed on position 5 + 2t in v 1 i } must be an exact 3-cover of E. It remains to settle Observation I, which says that w behaves equally in the votes corresponding to one subset. First, we argue that w must be inserted at position 5 + 2t in exactly q/3 votes of V Now, one has that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-hard for all scoring rules with a scoring vector of size f ((E, S)) with strictly decreasing score values. By using some simple padding, we extend the result for the remaining cases, that is for scoring vectors of size m ′ > f ((E, S)) andf ((E, S)) different score values. To this end, we introduce a set of m ′ −f ((E, S)) new dummy candidates and cast the linear votes such they cannot beat the distinguished candidate in any extension. The original candidates from C are placed on positions endued with strictly decreasing points, whereas the new candidates are placed on the remaining positions. Then, if the positions of candidates get shifted (when w is inserted), the "old" candidates are affected in the same manner as in the above construction and the theorem follows. 2
An unbounded number of positions with equal score values
In the previous section, we showed NP-hardness for scoring vectors with an unbounded number of different score values. In this section, we discuss scoring vectors with an unbounded number of positions with equal score value. In the first subsection, we show NP-hardness for POSSIBLE WINNER for scoring vectors that fulfill α 2 = α m−1 , and, in the second subsection, we consider the special case that α 1 > α 2 = · · · = α m−1 > 0. Note that these two cases cover all scoring vectors with an unbounded number of equal score values (except plurality and veto): There are three ways to "violate" α 1 > α 2 = · · · = α m−1 > 0. First, if one requires α 1 = α 2 , then one ends up with veto. Second, requiring α m−1 = 0, one arrives at plurality. Third, requiring α 2 = α m−1 , then one ends up with the other case that includes the famous examples 2-approval and (m − 2)-approval.
An unbounded number of equal score values and α
The scoring vectors considered in this subsection divide into two classes. First, there are at least two score values that are greater than the "equal score value". Second, there are at least two score values that are smaller than the "equal score value". Formally, a size-m scoring vector for the second class looks as follows: there is an i, with i < m − 2 and an "unbounded" integer x such that α i−x = α i > α i+1 . This property can be used to construct a basic "logical" tool used in the many-one reductions of this subsection: For two candidates c, c ′ , having c ≻ c ′ in a partial vote implies that setting c such that it makes less than α i points implies that also c ′ makes less than α i points whereas all candidates placed in the range between i − x and i make exactly α i points. This can be used to model some implication of the type "c ⇒ c ′ " in a vote. For (m − 2)-approval, which will play a prominent role for stating our results, this condition means that c only has the possibility to make zero points in a vote if also c ′ makes zero points in this vote whereas all other candidates make one point.
Most of the reductions of this subsection are from the NP-complete MULTICOL-ORED CLIQUE (MC) problem [22] :
Given: An undirected graph G = (X 1 ∪X 2 ∪· · ·∪X k , E) with X i ∩X j = ∅ for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k and the vertices of X i induce an independent set for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Question: Is there a complete subgraph (clique) of size k?
Here, 1, . . . , k are considered as different colors. Then, the problem is equivalent to ask for a multicolored clique, that is, a clique that contains one vertex for every color. To ease the presentation, for any 1 ≤ i = j ≤ k, we interpret the vertices of X i as red vertices and write r ∈ X i , and the vertices of X j as green vertices and write g ∈ X j .
Reductions from MC are often used to show parameterized hardness results [22] . Intuitively, the different colors give some useful structure to the instance. The general idea is to construct different types of gadgets. Here, the partial votes realize four kinds of gadgets. First, gadgets that choose a vertex of every color (vertex selection). Second, gadgets that choose an edge of every ordered pair of colors, for example, one edge from green to red and one edge from red to green (edge selection). Third, gadgets that check the consistency of two selected ordered edges, e.g. does the chosen red-green candidate refer to the same edge as the choice of the green-red candidate (edge-edge match)? Finally, gadgets that check whether all edges starting from the same color start from the same vertex (vertex-edge match). Though reductions from MC have become a standard tool to obtain hardness results, the reduction given here is not straightforward. For example, we are not aware of any reduction in the literature for which it is necessary to employ vertex-edge match gadgets.
We start by giving a reduction from MC that settles the NP-hardness of POSSIBLE WINNER for (m − 2)-approval. Then we describe how the given construction can be generalized to work for most of the cases considered in this subsection. The NPhardness of the remaining cases will be shown by reductions from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS.
Lemma 2. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-hard for
PROOF. Given an MC-instance G = (X, E) with X = X 1 ∪X 2 ∪· · ·∪X k . Let E(i, j) denote all edges from E between X i and X j . Without loss of generality, we can assume that there are integers s and t such that |X i | = s for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, |E(i, j)| = t for all i, j, and that k is odd since every other instance can be padded easily in this way. We construct a partial profile P on a set C of candidates such that the distinguished candidate c ∈ C is a possible winner if and only if there is a size-k clique in G. The set of candidates C := {c} ⊎ C X ⊎ C E ⊎ D, where ⊎ denotes the disjoint union, is specified as follows:
• For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, let C i,j := {rg | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), r ∈ X i , and g ∈ X j } and C ′ i,j := {rg ′ | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), r ∈ X i , and g ∈ X j }.
e., for every edge {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), the set C E contains the four candidates rg, rg ′ , gr, gr ′ .
• We refer to the candidates of C X as vertex-candidates, to the candidates of C E as edge-candidates, and to the candidates of D as dummy-candidates.
The partial profile P consists of a set of linear votes V l and a set of partial votes V p . In each extension of P , the distinguished candidate c gets one point in every vote from V p (see definition below). Thus, according to Lemma 1, we can set the maximum partial scores as follows. For every candidate
′ must get zero points in at least one of the partial votes.
In the following, we define
. For all our gadgets only the last positions of the votes are relevant. Hence, in the partial votes it is sufficient to explicitly specify the "relevant candidates". More precisely, we define for all partial votes that each candidate that does not appear explicitly in the description of a partial vote is positioned before all candidates that appear in this vote.
The partial votes of V 1 realize the edge selection gadgets. Basically, selecting an ordered edge (r, g) with {r, g} ∈ E means to select the corresponding pair of edge-candidates rg and rg ′ . The candidate rg is used for the vertex-edge match check and rg ′ for the edge-edge match check. Now, we give the definition of V 1 . For every ordered color pair (i, j), i = j, V 1 has t − 1 copies of the partial vote {rg ≻ rg ′ | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j)}, that is, one partial vote contains the constraint rg ≻ rg ′ for every {r, g} ∈ E(i, j). The idea of this gadget is as follows. For every ordered color pair we have t edges and t − 1 corresponding votes. Within one vote, one pair of edge-candidates can get the two available zero positions. Thus, it is possible to set all but one, namely the selected pair of edge-candidates, to zero positions. The partial votes of V 2 realize the vertex selection gadgets. Here, we will use the k − 1 candidates corresponding to a selected vertex to do the vertex-edge match for all edges that are incident in a multicolored clique. Formally, we set V 2 := V 
The partial votes of V 3 realize the vertex-edge match gadgets. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, for j < i, V 3 contains the vote {rg ≻ r j | {r, g} ∈ E, r ∈ X i , and g ∈ X j } and, for j > i, V 3 contains the vote {rg ≻ r j−1 | {r, g} ∈ E, r ∈ X i , and g ∈ X j }.
The partial votes of V 4 realize the edge-edge match gadgets. For every unordered color pair {i, j}, i = j there is the partial vote {rg ′ ≻ gr ′ | {r, g} ∈ E(i, j), r ∈ X i , and g ∈ X j }.
This completes the description of the partial profile. Now, we verify a property of the construction that is crucial to see the correctness: In total, the number of zero positions available in the partial votes is exactly equal to the sum of the minimum number of zero position the candidates of C\{c} must take such that c is a winner. We denote this property of the construction as tightness. To see the tightness property, we first compute the number of partial votes:
· · · > rg > r j for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j < i, r ∈ X i ∩ Q, and g ∈ X j ∩ Q · · · > rg > r j−1 for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j > i, r ∈ X i ∩ Q, and g ∈ X j ∩ Q V 4 : 
Regarding the number of zero positions that must be taken, we first compute the number of candidates for each subset:
The candidates of D 2 must take at least s−1 zero positions and all other candidates at least one. Thus, in total the number of zero positions must be at least
Furthermore, there are two zero positions for every partial vote. It is easy to verify that (1) times two equals (2) . Hence, the tightness of the construction is shown. It directly follows that if there is a candidate that takes more zero positions than desired, then c cannot win in this extension since then at least one zero position must be "missing" for another candidate.
We can now show the following claim to complete the proof. Claim: The graph G has a clique of size k if and only if c is a possible winner in P . "⇒" Given a multicolored clique Q of G of size k. We refer to the vertices and edges belonging to Q as solution vertices and solution edges, respectively, and to the corresponding candidates as solution candidates. Then, extend the partial profile P as given in Figure 3 . In the following we argue that in the given extension every candidate takes the required number of zero positions.
In V 1 , for every ordered color pair, all pairs of edge-candidates except the pair of solution edge-candidates are set to the last two positions in one of the t − 1 votes.
In V a 2 for every color i, we set all candidates r 1 that do not belong to the solution vertices and the corresponding c for p = 1, . . . , k − 2 to zero positions in the votes with even index. Thus, in V 2 , we have improved c upon all dummy candidates and upon all candidates corresponding to non-solution vertices, whereas each candidate corresponding to a solution vertex must still take a zero position. Now, it remains to set every candidate corresponding to a solution vertex or a solution edge to a zero position in at least one vote. Due to construction, for a solution edge {r, g} ∈ E, the two corresponding candidates rg ′ and gr ′ can be set to zero in the corresponding vote of V 4 . And, in V 3 the k − 1 vertex-candidates belonging to every solution vertex can be set to a zero position in combination with the corresponding edge-candidate. Thus, the distinguished candidate c is the winner of the described extension. "⇐" Given an extension of P in which c is a winner, we show that the "selected" candidates must correspond to a size-k clique. Recall that the number of zero positions that each candidate must take is "tight" in the sense that if one candidate gets an unnecessary zero position, then for another candidate there are not enough zero positions left.
First (edge selection), for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, we consider the candidates of C i,j . The candidates of C i,j can take zero positions in one vote of V 3 and in t − 1 votes of V 1 . Since |C i,j | = t and in the considered votes at most one candidate of C i,j can take a zero position, every candidate of C i,j must take one zero position in one of these votes. We refer to a candidate that takes the zero position in V 3 as solution candidate rg sol . For every non-solution candidate rg ∈ C i,j \{rg sol }, its placement in V 1 also implies that rg ′ gets a zero position, whereas rg ′ sol still needs to take one zero position (which is only possible in V 4 ).
Second, we consider the vertex selection gadgets. Here, analogously to the edge selection, for every color i, we can argue that in V a 2 , out of the set {r 1 | r ∈ X i }, we have to set all but one candidate to a zero position. The corresponding solution vertex is denoted as r sol . For every vertex r ∈ X i \{r sol }, this implies that the corresponding dummy-candidate c to the last two positions. Thus, one cannot set r sol 2 and r sol3 to a zero position within V 2 . Hence, the only remaining possibility for r sol2 and r sol 3 to get zero points remains within the corresponding votes in V 3 . This implies for every non-solution vertex r that r 2 and r 3 cannot get zero points in V 3 and thus we have to choose to put them on zero positions in the vote v Third, consider the vertex-edge match realized in V 3 . For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, there is only one remaining vote in which rg sol with r ∈ X i and g ∈ X j can take a zero position. Hence, rg sol must take this zero-position. This implies that the corresponding incident vertex-candidate x is also set to a zero-position in this vote. If x = r soli , then x has already a zero-position in V 2 . Hence, this would contradict the tightness and rg sol and the corresponding vertex must "match". Furthermore, the construction ensures that each of the k − 1 candidates corresponding to one vertex appears exactly in one vote of V 3 (for each of the k − 1 candidates, the vote corresponds to edges from different colors). Hence, c can only be a possible winner if a selected vertex matches with all selected incident edges.
Finally, we discuss the edge-edge match gadgets. In V 4 , for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i = j, one still needs to set the solution candidates from C i,j to zero positions. We show that this can only be done if the two "opposite" selected edge-candidates match each other. For two such edges rg sol and gr sol , r ∈ X i , g ∈ X j , there is only one vote in V 4 in which they can get a zero position. If rg sol and gr sol refer to different edges, then in this vote only one of them can get zero points, and thus the other one still beats c. Altogether, if c is a possible winner, then the selected vertices and edges correspond to a multicolored clique of size k.
2
By generalizing the reduction used for Lemma 2, one can show the following.
Theorem 2. An MC-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for a scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following. There is an
A suitable poly-type function f can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. We describe how to modify the reduction given in the proof of Lemma 2 to work for the considered cases. For this, let P on C denote a partial profile as constructed in the proof of Lemma 2. Since i ≤ m − 1, the position i + 1 must exist. We set x = f (I) := |C|− 2 and fill all positions smaller than i − x and all positions greater than i + 1 with dummy candidates that are different from candidates in C and that are beaten by c in every extension. We distinguish the two subcases α i = α i+1 (1a) and
For the case (1a), one can argue in complete analogy to Lemma 2 by "identifying" the two zero positions of Lemma 2 with position i and i + 1 and setting the maximum partial score as follows (which can be done without changing the partial votes due to Lemma 1). For all
, we need to argue that the tightness argument still holds. For this, we set the maximum partial scores as follows (which can be done without changing the partial votes due to Lemma 1). For all
. Now, in any extension in which c wins, each candidate in D 2 must be placed at least s − 1 times on position i + 1, and each of the other candidates must be placed on position i or i + 1 at least once. Then again, the number of positions i and i + 1 that still have to be assigned to candidates is exactly equal to the number of candidates that need to take these positions, hence, the tightness argument still holds. Thus, the correctness of the modified reduction can be shown in complete analogy to Lemma 2.
In the following, we consider scoring rules with an unbounded number x of equal positions for which it holds that there is an i ≥ 2 such that α i > α i+1 = · · · = α i+x . Parts of the results are based on further extensions of the MC-reduction used to prove Lemma 2. After that there still remain some cases for which it seems even more complicated to adapt the MC-reduction. However, for these cases we can make use of other properties of the scoring rules and settle them by less involved reductions from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS. As we will see in Section 7, the following Lemmata 3-6 cover all scoring vectors with i ≥ 2 such that α i > α i+1 = · · · = α i+x .
Lemma 3. An MC-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for a scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following.
There is an i ≥ 2 such that α i > α i+1 = · · · = α i+x with x = f (I) and there is a position j < i with α j < 2 α j+1 . A suitable poly-type function f can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. We describe how to modify the MC-reduction given in the proof of Lemma 2 to work for the considered case. For this, let P on C denote a partial profile as constructed in the proof of Lemma 2. First, we describe the construction for j = i − 1, that is, one has α i−1 < 2 α i . We construct a partial profile P as follows. We set x = f (I) = |C| − 2 and all positions < i − 1 and > i + x are filled with dummy candidates that are beaten by c in every extension. The positions not filled with dummies "contain" the partial votes of P in "reverse" order: In P all relative orders are given for pairs of candidates. In P we just "flip" every pair, for example, instead of having rg ≻ rg ′ we have rg ′ ≻ rg in V 1 . We define that all candidates that are not given explicitly are worse than the given candidates in a vote (instead of being better). By flipping the order of a pair, we adapt the "logical implication", for example, instead of having "if rg makes zero points, then also rg ′ makes zero points" in P , we have "if rg makes α i points, then also rg ′ makes at least α i points" in P . Furthermore, we set the maximum partial scores to s . Hence, we can use a tightness argument analogously to Lemma 2. Since we also adapted the logical implication, the correctness follows in complete analogy to Lemma 2.
The remaining cases (j < i − 1) follow by padding positions within the gadgets. More precisely, replace each specified pair, e.g. rg ′ ≻ rg by rg ′ ≻ rg ≻ H with a dummy set H of size i − (j + 1) and replace α i−1 by α j in the new definitions of the maximum partial scores.
So far, we settled the NP-hardness for scoring vectors with i ≥ 2 such that α i > α i+1 = · · · = α i+x if there is a position j < i with α j < 2 α j+1 . Without the constraint α j < 2 α j+1 , it seems pretty complicated to adapt the tightness property which is crucial for the MC-reduction. Fortunately, the remaining cases have some different properties that allow to settle them by less complicated reductions from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS. More precisely, in the following, we give three reductions with increasing difficulty. (Although all three reductions are self-contained, they might be easier to understand when reading them in the given order.) Lemma 4. An X3C-instance I can be reduced to a POSSIBLE WINNER-instance for a scoring rule which produces a size-m scoring vector that fulfills the following. There is an i ≥ 2 such that α i > α i+1 = · · · = α i+x with x = f (I) and there is a position j < i with α j ≥ 3 α i . A suitable poly-type function f for X3C can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. Let (E, S) denote an X3C-instance. Construct a partial profile P on a set of candidates C. The set C of candidates is defined by C := {c} ⊎ S ⊎ E ⊎ H ⊎ D where c denotes the distinguished candidate c, S := {s z | S z ∈ S}, E the set of candidates that represent the elements of the universe, and H and D contain disjoint candidates such that the following hold. We define H := |S| z=1 H z with |H z | = i − j for all z ∈ {1, . . . , |S|} needed to "pad" some positions relevant to the construction and |D| = m − |S| − |E| − |H| − 1 needed to pad irrelevant positions. We refer to the candidates from S as subset candidates and to the candidates from E as element candidates. Set f ((E, S)) := |C \ D| − (i − j). For 1 ≤ z ≤ |S|, let S z = {e z1 , e z2 , e z3 }. The partial profile P consists of a set of linear votes and a set of partial votes V p . In all votes of V p , we pad all irrelevant positions, i.e. all positions smaller than j and greater than j − 1 + |C \ D| by fixing candidates from D (omitted in the further description). The set V p consists of |S| − |E|/3 copies of the vote
denoted as V p 1 and the following three votes, denoted as V
The basic idea of this construction is that in V p 1 one has to set all but |E|/3 "subset" candidates to position j whereas the remaining candidates will be able to take a position greater than i in all votes from V p 1 . Therefore, the remaining |E|/3 subset candidates can make α j − α i+1 points more than the other candidates within the remaining votes. This will enable them to shift their corresponding element candidates to position i + 1 by taking position i. Since α j > 3 · α i , they will be able to shift all three element candidates, respectively. To realize the basic idea, we adapt the maximum partial scores appropriately. For e ∈ E, let n e denote the number of subsets in S which contain e. Then according to Lemma 1, we can cast the linear votes such that the following holds:
• s max p (e) = (n e − 1) · α i +(|V p | − n e + 1) · α i+1 , for all e ∈ E, and
• all other candidates are beaten by c in every extension.
We show that c is a possible winner in P if and only if there is an exact 3-cover for (E, S):
Assume there is an exact 3-cover Q. Then one extends P by setting each s z with S z / ∈ Q at position j in one vote from V Since α j ≥ 3 α i , the maximum partial score of s z is not exceeded. Because Q is an exact 3-cover, all element candidates are shifted to position i + 1 in one vote and thus are beaten by c. Hence, c is a winner in the described extension.
For the other direction, consider an extension of P in which c wins. Due to construction, in V p 1 only subset candidates from S can take position j. Because of the maximum partial scores, position j must be taken by different candidates from S in the |S| − |E|/3 votes of V 1 p . We denote these candidates as non-solution candidates and the remaining |E|/3 candidates from S as solution candidates. Due to s max p (s z ), every non-solution candidate must take position i + 1 in all remaining votes and thus the corresponding element candidates must make α i points in the corresponding votes. Hence, there remain only |E|/3 solution candidates that have to "shift" the |E| element candidates to position i + 1. Since every solution candidate can shift at most 3 candidates, the solution candidates must correspond to an exact 3-cover.
In the following lemma, we consider a more specific type of scoring vector in the sense that there are only two score values greater than zero. This restriction allows us to find an easy way to "lift" the condition "α j ≥ 3 · α i " for two special types of scoring rules that will be sufficient for the proof of the main result in Section 7. Compared to the reduction from the previous lemma, for the following cases we also choose a set of "solution subset candidates" within the first part of the partial votes, but we will need some additional gadgetry to be able to "shift" the corresponding element candidates. PROOF. Let (E, S) denote an X3C-instance. Construct a partial profile P on a set of candidates C as follows. The set of candidates consists of a distinguished candidate c, a set S := {s i | S i ∈ S} (the subset candidates), a set D := {d i | S i ∈ S}, the set E (the element candidates), a candidate x, and H := {h 1 , . . . , h |S| }. Set f ((E, S)) := |C| − 2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|, let S i = {e i1 , e i2 , e i3 }. The partial profile P consists of a set of linear votes and a set of partial votes V p . The set V p consists of |S| − |E|/3 copies of the vote
denoted as V p 1 and the following three votes for every
Let n e denote the number of subsets in which e occurs. Then, due to Lemma 1, we can set the maximum partial scores as follows:
• s max p (e) = (n e − 1) · α 2 for all e ∈ E,
Assume there is an exact 3-cover Q for (E, S). Then we extend P as follows. For every S i / ∈ Q, s i takes position 1 and h i takes position 2 in one vote from V To see the other direction, assume there is an extension in which c wins. In V p 1 , the first positions can only be taken by candidates from S. Since each s i ∈ S can get α 1 points exactly once, |S| − |E|/3 different subset candidates from S have to be placed on the first position. Let the set consisting of these candidates be denoted by S ′ . Every candidate s i from S ′ has exploited its maximum partial score and therefore has to be placed on the third position in v i . Hence, for s i ∈ S ′ , the corresponding element candidates e i1 , e i2 , e i3 receive α 2 points each. However, each of the element candidates from E has to be placed on position 3 at least once due to its maximum partial score. This can only be in the remaining partial votes, that is, all v PROOF. Let (E, S) denote an X3C-instance. Construct a partial profile P on a set of candidates C as follows. The set of candidates consists of a distinguished candidate c, a set S := {s i | S i ∈ S} (the subset candidates), D := {d i | S i ∈ S}, T := {t i | S i ∈ S}, E (the element candidates), a candidate y, and X := {x 1 , . . . ,
The partial profile P consists of a set of linear votes and a set of partial votes V p . The set 
The set V p 2 consists of |S| − |E|/3 copies of the partial vote y ≻ T ≻ C\(T ∪ {y})
for S i ∈ Q Table 3 : Extension for the X3C-reduction for the case (2, 1, 0, . . . ). The remark "different q" means that for i = i ′ with S i / ∈ Q and S i ′ / ∈ Q one chooses two different candidates from X. Extensions corresponding to non-solution candidates are highlighted. and V p 3 contains the following three votes for every
This implies that e i1 is not shifted and that t i takes a middle position in v 2 i . Now, for t i it follows analogously that t i must take the last position in v 3 i and thus neither e i2 nor e i3 is shifted. Altogether, this means that all element candidates must be shifted by candidates from S ′ . Every s i ∈ S ′ can shift three candidates by setting s i in the last position in v In the remainder of this subsection, we consider the case that α 1 > 2 · α 2 . We also give a reduction from X3C. Note that the previous proof cannot be transferred directly and thus we give a modified construction for which it will be more laborious to show the correctness. .
Claim 1:
In an extension in which c wins, it holds that l i ≤ 1 for all i.
To prove Claim 1, we show that j = 0. More specifically, we prove that j > 0 implies that the total benefit B := t i=1 b i is less than 3k. This means that not all 3k element candidates can take a last position and thus c cannot win.
Assume that j > 0. We start to show how to distribute the last and the first positions of V p 1 and V p 2 in order to maximize B. For that sake, let T j := j i=1 t i denote the number of top positions that were taken by the first j candidates s 1 , . . . , s j . Now, we consider the remaining indices i ∈ {j + 1, . . . , t}. Since for all of them l i ≤ 1, it must also hold t i ≤ 1 (see Case I and Case II). Thus and because of Equation (4), there must be at least t − k − T j candidates from s j+1 , . . . , s t with t i = 1. For both remaining cases (l i = 1 and l i = 0), the benefit b i is greater for the case t i = 0 than it is for the case t i = 1 (cf. Case I and Case II). Hence, to maximize the total benefit B, it is desirable to minimize the number of candidates having t i = 1. Since there are t − j indices greater than j and t i must be equal to one for at least t − k − T j indices, there are at most t − j − (t − k − T j ) = k + T j − j indices with t i = 0 (Observation 4). Furthermore, for every index from {j + 1, . . . , s r }, by setting t i to zero or one, one can "choose" between b i = 1 and b i = 3 (Case II). For the remaining indices, one can choose between b i = 0 and b i = 1 by setting t i to zero or one (Case I). We show by contradiction that choosing Case IIa (which results in b i = 3) as often as possible is the way to maximize B:
Assume that Case IIa holds, that is l i = 1 and t i = 0, is not chosen as often as possible. Then, first, there must be an index i ∈ {j + 1, . . . , r} with t i = 1 and hence with b i = 1 (Case IIb). Second, there must be an index x > r with t x = 0 and hence b x = 1 (Case Ia). Then setting t i = 1 and t x = 0 does not violate Equation (4) and has the following effect.
• b i is increased by 2 (from 1 to 3),
• b x is decreased by 1 (from 1 to 0). Thus, B = t i=1 b i was not maximal. Now, we have argued that to maximize B, one has to choose Case IIa as often as possible (Observation 5). Using this, we can compute the maximal value max B of B (showing that is must be less than 3k). For that sake, we first consider the benefit coming from the first j candidates s 1 , . . . , s j , which we denote by B j := 
which will be needed in the following. Due to the previous discussion we know that in the remaining positions, we have to choose t i = 0 for k+T j −j indices (cf. Observation 4) and one should choose Case IIa, that is, l i = 1 and t i = 0, as often as possible (cf. Observation 5). Clearly, l i = 1 must be chosen k − j i=1 l i times whereas there are k + T j − j indices with t i = 0. Hence, to compute a total upper bound on B, we have to distinguish two cases: First,
For the first case, we obtain
Since |B 3 j | ≤ j it holds that the maximal value of B is strictly less than 3k for j ≥ 1. Thus, at least one element candidate does not take a last position and hence beats c, a contradiction.
For the second case, we obtain
Furthermore, in this case it follows directly from k−
For j > 0 this means that T j < j. By definition, we have |B 3 j | ≤ j, and thus max B is less than 3k. This completes the proof of Claim 1. We therefore have j = 0 which means l i ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and thus also t i ≤ 1 for all i (Case I and II).
Third step. We now show that there cannot be any candidate s i which takes one last position and one first position in V 1 ∪ V 2 , i.e. we cannot have t i = l i = 1 for any s i . Assume that the set of candidates Q := {s i | t i = l i = 1} is not empty. Then, due to Observation 3, the maximum value of B is Since c can only be a winner if each of the 3k element candidates takes a last position in a vote from V p 3 and in total at most 3k element candidates can take a last position in V p 3 , every element candidate must take exactly one last position. Thus, for i = j such that s i and s j take a last position in V p 2 , {e i1 , e i2 , e i3 } and {e j1 , e j2 , e j3 } must be disjoint. It follows that {S i | s i takes a last position in V p 2 } forms an exact 3-cover. 2
Putting all together
We are now ready to combine the many-one reductions from the previous sections to one general reduction. Basically, the problem we encounter by using one specific reduction from the previous sections is that such a reduction produces a POSSIBLE WIN-NER-instance with a certain number m of candidates. Thus, one needs to ensure that the size-m scoring vector provides a sufficient number of positions with equal/different scores. This seems not to be possible in general. However, for every specific instance of EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS or MULTICOLORED CLIQUE, we can compute a number of positions with equal or different scores that is sufficient for the corresponding reduction, and we can use the maximum of all these numbers for the combined reduction. This is the underlying idea for the following proof. PROOF. We give a reduction from X3C restricted to instances of size greater than z to POSSIBLE WINNER for r. Let I with |I| > z denote an X3C-instance. Since X3C and MC are NP-complete, there is a polynomial-time reduction from X3C to MC. Hence, let I ′ denote an MC-instance whose size is polynomial in |I| and which is a yes-instance if and only if I is a yes-instance.
Let f 1 denote a poly-type function to compute the number of different score values as stated for Theorem 1, f 
, f 4 (I), f 5 (I)} and consider the scoring vector − → α of size x · (x + 1) produced by r. Then we show the following. Claim: For − → α it holds that |{i | α i > α i+1 }| ≥ x or that α i = · · · = α i+x for some position i. The correctness of the claim can be seen as follows. First, assume that − → α does not fulfill α i > α j for x different positions i. Then consider x · (x + 1) indices of − → α . Since they can have at most x different score values, there must be a single score value that is assigned to at least x + 1 indices, that is, there is an index i with α i = · · · = α i+x . Second, if there is no index i such that α i = · · · = α i+x for a position i, then again consider x · (x + 1) indices of − → α . Since each score value can be assumed at most x times, there must be at least x different score values. Now, due to the Claim, we can distinguish two main cases. If − → α has at least x different score values, then we apply the X3C-reduction given in Theorem 1. Otherwise, we have an unbounded number of equal score values. In this case we distinguish the subcases given in Table 4 . For all these subcases, there are many-one reductions used in the corresponding lemmata/theorems. Hence, it remains to show that each scoring vector can be handled by at least one of these cases. Clearly, − → α must have the form α i−x = · · · = α i−1 > α i for an i ≤ m − 1 (Case I), or α i > α i+1 = · · · = α i+x for i ≥ 2 (Case II), or α 1 > α 2 = α m−1 > α m = 0 and α 1 = 2 · α 2 (Case III). For Case I and Case III, the existence of many-one reductions follows immediately from the corresponding Theorems 2 and 4. Thus, it remains to discuss Case II, the case that − → α has the form α i > α i+1 = · · · = α i+x for i ≥ 2.
To this end, we start with the case i > 2. Clearly, there must be at least three scoring values which are not equal to zero, namely, α i−2 , α i−1 , and α i . If one has α i−1 < 2 α i or α i−2 < 2 α i−1 , then NP-hardness follows directly from Lemma 3. Otherwise, one must have α i−1 ≥ 2 α i and α i−2 ≥ 2 α i−1 . Hence, it follows that α i−2 ≥ 4 α i and NP-hardness follows directly from Lemma 4. It remains to consider all scoring rules of type (α 1 , α 2 , 0, . . . , 0). Here, we can distinguish the following four cases:
• α 1 < 2 α 2 : NP-hardness follows from Lemma 3,
• α 1 = 2 α 2 : NP-hardness follows from Lemma 6,
• 2 α 2 < α 1 < 3 α 2 : NP-hardness follows from Lemma 5, and
• α 1 ≥ 3 α 2 : NP-hardness follows from Lemma 4.
Since the membership in NP is obvious, the main theorem follows.
Pure scoring rules. Based on all previous considerations, for pure scoring rules we almost arrive at a dichotomy. More precisely, we can state the following. PROOF. Plurality and veto are polynomial-time solvable due to Proposition 1. Having any non-trivial scoring vector different from (1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1, 0), and (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) for m candidates, it is not possible to obtain a scoring vector of one of these three types (or (0, . . . , 0)) for m ′ > m by inserting scoring values. Hence, since we only consider pure scoring rules, the scoring rule does not produce a scoring vector of type plurality, veto, (0, . . . , 0), or (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) for all m ≥ z. Then the statement follows by Theorem 5.
2 "Non-pure" scoring rules. We end this section with a brief informal discussion about the problem of classifying non-pure scoring rules in general. As stated in Theorem 5, we can show NP-hardness for non-pure scoring rules if (starting from a constant number of candidates) all produced scoring vectors are "difficult". Clearly, it is possible to extend the range of NP-hardness results to scoring rules that produce only few "easy" vectors; for example, having a difficult vector for all odd numbers of candidates and an easy vector for all even ones. However, this is not possible in general. Roughly speaking, if the underlying difficult part of the language becomes too sparse, then there cannot be a many-one reduction from an NP-complete problem since the densities of the problems are not polynomially related (see e.g. [30] ). Note that this situation does not appear for the dichotomy result from Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [25] for MANIPULATION for weighted voters. The intuitive reason for this is that their reductions for the NP-hardness in the case of weighted voters already hold for a constant number of candidates (and all scoring rules except plurality are NP-hard in this case).
Conclusion and outlook
In this work, we settled the computational complexity for POSSIBLE WINNER for almost all pure scoring rules. More precisely, the only case that was left open regards the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) , whereas for all other rules except plurality and veto, we obtained NP-completeness results. In a very recent work, Baumeister and Rothe [2] completed the dichotomy by showing the NP-completeness of POSSIBLE WINNER for the case of (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) .
A natural next step of research is to investigate algorithmic approaches that deal with NP-hard problems like approximation algorithms or "efficient" exponential-time algorithms. Here, an interesting approach is to consider the parameterized complexity [15, 23, 28] and its sequel multivariate algorithmics [29] . There are first considerations for several voting rules [7] as well as fixed-parameter tractability results for POSSIBLE WINNER for k-approval with respect to the combined parameter "number of partial votes" and k [3] . A parameter of general interest is the "number of candidates". In this case, POSSIBLE WINNER is shown to be fixed-parameter tractable for several voting systems using a powerful classification framework based on integer linear programming but still lacks efficient combinatorial fixed-parameter algorithms [7] . Furthermore, multivariate complexity analysis might offer a way to tackle the POSSI-BLE WINNER problem for voting systems for which the "normal" winner determination is already NP-hard. For example, there are recent studies for Kemeny, Dodgson, and Young elections that contain parameterized algorithms with respect to several parameters [4, 5, 6, 32] . It is open whether such results can be achieved for the POSSIBLE WINNER problem.
The POSSIBLE WINNER problem not only generalizes the MANIPULATION problem but also comprises other relevant special cases. For example, very recently, Chevaleyre et al. [10] investigated the computational complexity of the following problem: Given a set of linear votes, an integer s, and a distinguished candidate c, can one add s candidates such that c becomes a winner? There is reasonable hope to achieve more positive algorithmic results for this and other relevant special cases of POSSIBLE WIN-NER.
A further direction of future research regards the counting version of POSSIBLE WINNER [1] . Here, one wants to find out in how many extensions a distinguished candidate wins. Answering this question allows to compare two candidates that are possible winners.
